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In the FSB internal opposition to Vladimir Putin is being generated. The staff officers are not pleased with the dictatorial ambitions of the former Lieutenant Colonel or by the transformation of the national security agency into a political guard.
Strangely enough, nine years of constant and senseless reshuffling of the KGB into the МGB into the FSK and finally into the FSB has brought a new psychology to the officers of the State Security Service.
Many officers were pleased when the political aspects of the department had ended when the so-called 5th directorate was shut down.
But this situation didn't last long.
Even without the directorate itself the traditions of political surveillance have, in essence, returned.
All sections appear to be integrated now through the auspices of a systemic phasing down of various departments involved in economic safety, departments involved in operations and technical development as well as those departments involved in recruitment within political parties.
Before politicians, deputies and ministers fell within a certain 'Zone' of interest within the state security apparatus only when there was concrete suspicion. Now that work has precise regularity.
For example, one division works on [former Prime Minister and opposition leader] Primakov, another on [Communist Party head] Zyuganov.
As in the old times when they worked on Sakharov or Solzhenitysn.
The same rudimentary and insufficient style of reports showing an agent's information or surveillance materials [as were used against dissidents] are now being utilized against political opponents instead of real matters of national security. And the result of this inefficiency is the discontinuance of investigative actions on, for example, the business of the Central Bank and the GKO.
For the last year, (for its own safety) the FSB has been encouraging a system of internal informants and has been increasingly tracing the political reliability of its personnel. In this atmosphere of 'spy-hunting' there is a growing sense of discontent within the middle echelon of the FSB, especially among the counter-intelligence officers.
There is a feeling of unease. And to Putin and [FSB head] Patrushev this isn't news. They are fully informed, for example, that in FAPSI [the Russian version of the US National Security Agency] only 12 percent of officers of average rank respond positively to the actions of Putin.
It's strange, that in this environment, for the last year there has been a system of counter-intelligence led by the Putin group. We can speak about this without fear inasmuch as it is impossible to recapture the wind, or for that matter, to close the mouths of those people who have made a career in the post-perestroika era.
Such people study Putin and they want to understand, who is he? A puppet? Or a man capable of denying the old cronies? Is he someone who is capable of thinking, not of his own demands, but of the State?
So far, their conclusions are not in favour of the professional and human qualities of the president.
It is possible to judge based on sketchy materials of the survelleince materials obtained by The FLB.
By the way, with these analysis dated in June, August and September of '99 it is possible to look at post-1999 by what came to power...Vladimir Putin.
June 1999
"Instructions from Putin"
In the center of public communications of the FSB there are 20 officers assigned whose tasks include the realization of 'active measures' in regards to disloyal journalists. The overall objective is revealing sources of information. Aside from that objective the division has recently received instructions from Putin:
1. To suspend active measures against Berezovsky and not to touch Gusinsky. With these people investigations are to be limited to the analysis and accumulation of information, appearing in press.
2. To withdraw all available materials concerning 'The Family' [Boris Yeltsins immediate confidantes and relatives] and to curtail work in this direction by cutting ties with their sources.
3. Not to write any documents on the problems of political opposition, which could be observed by secretaries or technical workers within the divisions of the FSB.
August 1999
"Putin's Wife was in Hysterics"
During his year of work as the Chief of the FSB, Putin began the tradition of organizing at the State Dacha at Barvikha "secular receptions" about twice a month. Originally the Chiefs of the central sections of the service and some "pensioners" were invited to these parties as well as the security chiefs of large banks and firms (probably old special services were necessary for Putin and Patrushev to know how to work every day). Since that time Putin has begun to visit his summer residence regularly along with Chubais. Then with the same regularity Putin began to invite Dyachenko and Yumashev. And since May, 1999 he began meeting with Voloshin.
But this group was devoted to secular pursuits only a small part of the time. Basically they organized business meetings in Putin's study. As a matter of fact, the participants of these meetings carried out working meetings and constantly brought with them official documents.
The role of the manager and the hospitable hostess was carried out by Putin's wife, Ludmilla. She created the conditions for private conversations in her husband's study. She kept an eye on the attendants (cooks, waiters, and the protection). All had their orders to stay out of earshot. The sources judge that it is at this period of time when the "Family" began to center in on their possible (and probable) successor to Yeltsin. And the successor in turn actively justified their trust, by carrying out specific assignments ordered by the closest circle of Boris Yeltsin.
The next reception was called for the eve of the assignment of Putin to Prime Minister (August 9th). But this time no representative from the 'Grey Cardinal' of the Kremlin had arrived. Putin's wife was in hysterics. Patrushev went grey and gloomy. The party quickly turned sour.
August, 1999
"Results of the surveillance of the Moscow Team"
The sources indicate, that these parties reminded them of sessions at a secret lodge. At which Putin tried to gain supporters. Every new person invited to the parties either became a member of the team or didn't come again. For example, starting in June 1999 the head of the 'Department K', General Zotov, who was in charge of monitoring the mass media, ordered his subordinates to prepare a report on the regional and national press. These reports were regularly taken to Putin's parties. But our sources believe that Zotov never became an insider because the president's advisors were not pleased with the results of his work and were uncertain of Zotov's reliability.
Throughout the summer of 1999 all high ranking generals went through a similar process at Putin's dacha wherein they were tested for their loyality. During this period, the surveillance departments of the FSB began to be used in the interests of the Kremlin administration.
For example, even beaurecrats in the Moscow city government were examined, in no small part, because they were the biggest opposition to the Kremlin.
A lot of these files ended up on the desk of the Yeltsin's chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin. But all these files were first censored by Vladimir Putin.
September, 1999
"Increase informants within the press"
According to our sources the flow of information from the FSB analytical department directly to Voloshin sharply reduced. Eventually Voloshin realized the situation had changed and stopped requesting information from the FSB. From then on, all the documents were sent only to then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
The interests of the new premiere is of significant note. They were reduced basically to six topics:
1. Intelligence reports on the situation in Dagestan.
2. Reports about the internal situation in all Russian political parties and movements.
3. Intelligence reports about the political sympathies of the chief editors of all mass media outlets. For example, Putin's response to one such report was that the number of informants in the mass media must be increased and that financial support for such an effort would be forthcoming.
4. Putin paid special attention to all reports regarding former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.
5. Putin studied the regional leadership and their popularity ratings. As well as his own popularity ratings in the provinces.
6. Daily reviews of the press.
Putin requested reports on all these topic on a regular basis as soon as he became Prime Minister. Some sources say Putin reported to then President Yeltsin on information regarding points 1,4 and 5.
September, 1999
'Yeltsin should leave on September 19"
At the end of August - beginning of September Putin sent to the FSB three orders:
1. To leak to the mass media information about the upcoming resignation of Boris Yeltsin (the concrete date - was hinted as being approximately on September 19-24, 1999).
2. In response to a news report showing the killing of hostages (by Chechen rebels) broadcast on NTV [Russia's independent television network] Putin ordered ORT [Russia's Public television network- partially owned by the state] to broadcast a report concerning the bombardment of Chechen villages by the Russian airforce. The purpose of this order seems to be to test the theory of placing an 'experienced negotiator' (Boris Berezovsky) as special advisor on the situation in the Caucusus.
3. To increase the work of antiterrorist units within the FSB in connection with the aparment building bombings in Moscow and Buynaksk.
At the same time, the employees FAPSI were warned that on the eve of presidential elections they would be given the names of the candidates for which they must vote. They were given Putin's name.
November, 1999
"I was appointed by Yeltsin's Family"
According to the order of FSB director Nikolai Patrushev the analytical departmetns of the the FSB were preparing a report concerning various facets of Putin's popularity.
The analysis was centered in on three directions:
1. The results of polls conducted by various official agencies. The FSB concluded that Putins real rating was no more than fifty percent of what was said released publically. The reasoning: insufficient activity in the economic decision making process. Putin's lack of attention towards Russia's impoverished population. It was also said many didn't support Putin because they feared his past as a KGB officer.
2. Analysis of Putin's raring in The West.
This report was prepared by the foreign intelligence service of Russia. It concluded that Putin's rating in the West was 2%-5%. Westerners didn't like him, again, because of his past. There was also disapproval because of his standing as a hawk. Westerners also noticed his presidential ambitions early on, especially the brash support given to Putin by Yeltsin and the indescrete display of this support (At one point Putin went so far as to openly comment 'You can do what ever you want but I will be president'). Western sources also were confident of the presence of compromising information about Putin but for some reason that information was not being reported in the Russian press.
3. According to FAPSI, in September about 40% of the Russian intellegince community was prepared to vote for Putin. But among the young employees, Putin's rating was no higher than 5%. 5-12% of middle level officers supported him. Generals were much more loyal. About 60% supported him. At the same time law enforcment officers were told, 'He will be our man in power. He won't forget about us.
November, 1999
"FSB informants are at work in Primakov and Lushkov's circle"
As we have mentioned, Putin received on a weekly basis reports about the status of political parties in Russia, including the pro-kremlin 'Unity' party.
Of special interest to Putin were the characteristics of the party leadership.
Every report was sent directly to Putin from Patroshev. Also, FSB informants within Primakov and Lushkov's circles reported to Putin regulary on the two opposition leader's personal and professional lives. Our sources especially noticed that Putin was NOT interested in real or fake compromsing information on either of them. Putin paid special attention to the parts of the reports which revealed their opinion of Putin.
Putin regularly met with FSB director Patroshev's dacha about this.
The question is, In Russia is such a scandal of the likes of Watergate possible. Especially when the information about this interference and investigation headed by Putin is known throughout Russia?
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